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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
z

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

vs.

:

GARY L. BOUCK,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Case No. 900122-CA

:

Brief of Respondent

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of

Appeals to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (d) (1953,
as amended).
2.

This appeal is from a final judgment in the Second

Circuit Court, Layton Department, wherein a trial by jury was held
on the 7th day of February/ 1990, with m e Honorable Judge Roger S.
Dutson presiding. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty
as charged of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953, as amended)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trooper's statement that defendant was sitting
in the car, together with the driver's license information,
adequately identify the defendant?
2.

Did the trooper engage in an improper procedure which
1

renders his testimony unreliable?
3. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict,
was there sufficient evidence to support conviction?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the statutory provisions upon which the
State relies are included in the body of this brief and are
included verbatim in the addendum.
Constitutional provisions relied upon:
United States Constitution, Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.
No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
2

impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been compmitted,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a criminal case wherein the
defendant was charged with and found guilty of Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953,
as amended).
The case was tried by a jury on the 7th day of February,
1990, in the Layton Department of the Second Circuit Court, with
the Honorable Judge Roger S. Dutson presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At

approximately

1:20

a.m.

on

July

16,

1989, the

defendant's vehicle was observed by Trooper Jon Cady of the Utah
Highway Patrol, parked

in the median between the north and

southbound lanes of Interstate 15, near Burton's Lane in Davis
County, Utah.
As the defendant came out of the vehicle, Trooper Cady
asked the defendant for his driver's license, which he did produce.
(T. 3, 7)
Following the performance of the field sobriety tests,
Trooper Cady arrested the defendant, Gary L. Bouck, whom he
identified by means of his pictured Utah driver's license, and

3

transported

him

to the Davis County Jail

to

administer an

intoxilyzer test.
Trooper Cady cited the defendant, Gary L. Bouck, for
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §41-6-44 (1953, as amended), and the defendant was tried
several months later and found guilty of the offense as charged.
During the trial, the trooper testified that he received
from "defendant" a Utah driver's license. (T. 3) He further stated
the identity of the individual on the driver's license was Gary L.
Bouck, with an address of 1490 South Roberta Street. (T. 3)

In

addition, during the trial the following exchange took place:
Q:

Okay. When you initially went up to the car, was the

engine running?
A:

No.

It was not.

Q: Who was in the car?
A:

The defendant.

Q:

Only the defendant?

A:

Just the defendant.

Q: And what was his position in the car?
A:

Behind the driver's steering wheel in the left front

side of the vehicle.
(T. 5, line 25 through T. 6, line 9)
Defense counsel did not cross-examine the witness on the
issue of identity, but did move to dismiss at the close of the
State's case, based on the absence of an identification.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
4

The sole issue before this Court is whether an "in-court"
identification of the defendant is required to support a juryverdict.
The defendant's summary of argument attempts to create
three issues from a single observation, that observation being that
Trooper Cady did not point out the individual seated at defense
counsel table as being the same Gary L. Bouck arrested and cited on
July 16, 1989.
The defendant was properly identified by Trooper Cady at
the time and place of the defendant's arrest by use of a driver's
license obtained from the defendant.
The circumstances under which the defendant was identified
at the time were not suggestive or unfair.

Defendant was

identified at the scene. The issues raised in State v. Myers, 570
P.2d 1252 (Arizona 1977), and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972),
do not apply in this fact situation since there is no evidence of
unfair police conduct which resulted in rendering an unreliable
identification by an eyewitness.
Based on the well-established standard of review on appeals
on sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict.

The verdict should

therefore be upheld.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TROOPER SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT
AT TRIAL BY REFERRING TO THE DEFENDANT AS THE
PERSON BEHIND THE WHEEL OF THE CAR, AND FURTHER BY
TESTIFYING ABOUT THE DRIVER'S LICENSE INFORMATION.
5

Appellant alleges that Trooper Cady improperly identified
the defendant as the person guilty of Driving Under the Influence
of Alcohol,

Appellant fails to indicate clearly how his rights

were violated, how he was denied due process, or denied any other
specific right.

The most pertinent portions of the referenced

constitutional provisions seem to be those which guarantee a
defendant the right to confrontation. In this case, the defendant
was afforded that right.

Trooper Cady, the complaining witness

against the defendant, appeared for the prosecution and the
defendant had the opportunity to confront, to cross-examine, and to
challenge testimony. Defendant also had the assistance of counsel
in doing so.
Appellant claims in his brief that the "trial court erred
in it's decision to convict the Defendant by not recognizing the
failure

of

the

prosecution

to

identification of the defendant."

provide

a

specific

in-court

This statement does not appear

to rely on any constitutional guarantee.

Rather, it seems to

depend on an assertion that such an identification is required,
without providing any authority for the requirement. The defendant
cites the case of State v. Myers, supra, and quotes:
It is essential that the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the identification
indicate that the defendant has not been
mistakenly identified.
In Myers, however, the facts are much different than those
in the case now before this Court.

In this case, however, there is

nothing to show that "the totality of the circumstances" hints at
a misidentification.

The cited case does not state than an "in6

court" identification is necessary to prevent misidentification,
but rather that "the primary concern of the law is that the
identification be reliable."
In State vs. Jollev, 571 P.2d 582 (Utah. 1977), the issue
of "in-court" identification was addressed. There the court states
that,
Appellant would have us believe that the
constitutional protection afforded the accused by
his right to be confronted by his witnesses
requires that each witness point a finger at him
and say, "He's the one." That is not so. Article
1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution merely
means that the accused may see the witnesses in
order to make any objections he may have, and to
exercise the opportunity to cross-examine them.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently
held that the constitutional clause is satisfied
if there is an adequate opportunity for crossexamination, even in the absence of physical
confrontation.
There is no evidence that an "in-court" identification is
necessary. The requirement is that the identification be reliable
and, in this case, there is no suggestion that the defendant, Gary
L. Bouck, was not reliably identified by Trooper Cady as the person
guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.
Appellant cites State vs. Hill, 520 P. 2d 618 (Wash 1974)
for the proposition that the prosecution bears the burden of
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the identify of the accused
as the person who committed the offense.

In Hill, the defendant

claimed the evidence of identification wc~ insufficient because no
specific "in-court" identification was made.

The court held,

however, that the evidence was adequate to establish identification
where "the defendant was present in the courtroom at all pertinent

times throughout the course of the trial, during which there were
numerous references in the testimony to "the defendant" and to
"Jimmy Hill."

The arresting officer testified that it was "the

defendant" whom he observed at the scene. Hill, at 619.
Similarly in Dillon vs. State, 508 P.2d 652 (Okl. Cr.
1973), the Court upheld the sufficiency of the identification of
the defendant where the transcript reflected the identity of the
defendant and his presence at trial, even though no specific "incourt" identification was made.
POINT II.
THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY THE
TROOPER DID NOT RENDER HIS TESTIMONY UNRELIABLE
The defendant states that the procedures used to identify
Gary L. Bouck were unduly suggestive, citing as authority Neil v.
Biggers# supra.

Biggers deals with suggestive police procedures

where an eyewitness makes the identification after the crime has
been committed.

The evil to be prevented is misidentification

which results in arrest or issuance of charges based on an
unreliable line-up or show-up procedure. The facts of this case do
not involve any such procedure.

In this case, Trooper Cady

identified and arrested the defendant at the scene of the incident.
If the jury had concluded, after observing the defendant
sitting at the table with the defense attorney and conversing with
him during the trial, and being referred to as both "the defendant"
and "Mr. Bouck" without comment that he was Gary L. Bouck, it would
not constitute reversible error. The purpose of the trial was to
determine the guilt of the defendant, Gary L. Bouck, who was
8

charged with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol on July 16,
1989, not to determine the identity of the individual that counsel
chose to have sit with him at the defendant's table.

The jury

found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gary L. Bouck was guilty as
charged.

It is not certain that the jury even considered the

question of whether Gary L. Bouck was the person seated with the
defense counsel.

If that person was not Mr. Bouck, then it seems

that the defendant voluntarily surrendered his right to be present
and confront witnesses.
Pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure (1990), the defendant may voluntarily absent himself from
trial and the trial can proceed without him so long as it is not a
prosecution for an offense punishable by death.

The procedural

requirement is that the defendant be given notice of the time for
trial. His absence shall not prevent the case from being tried and
a verdict or judgment entered there shall have the same effect as
if defendant had been present.

Even if the defendant wants to be

present, the court may exclude him for good cause shown which may
include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
In Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d

1148 (Wyo. 1984), the

defendant voluntarily absented himself from the trial and then
contended that his conviction should be reversed because neither
the victim nor any witness adequately identified him in court as
the perpetrator of the crime charged.

The court stated that such

an identification was unnecessary, that "[i]t is only necessary
that the person committing the crime be identified as the person
9

charged in the indictment or information." The court also observed
that "[t]he method of identification used in a criminal trial is a
matter largely within the discretion of the trial court."
In the instant case, when the identification issue was
raised by defendant's counsel (T.8, line 10) the court stated, "I
think it's an issue that the jury can decide."

That issue, along

with the rest of the case, was submitted to the jury for decision
and that decision was a verdict finding Gary L. Bouck guilty.
POINT III.
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY
VERDICT, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION
The defendant states in his brief that it "is fundamental
law that the defendant be present for his trial and have the
opportunity to confront witnesses."

It is arguable whether this

is, in fact, fundamental law, but it is more pertinent to observe
that there was no denial of a right to be present and to confront
witnesses.

Contrary to defendant's assertion, an "in-court"

identification is not required to enable a defendant to crossexamine witnesses and the defendant's counsel did conduct an
apparently uninhibited

cross-examination

of the prosecution's

witness.
The issue raised in defendant's

POINT III, however, is

supposedly one of insufficient evidence and not one concerning
restrictions on cross-examination.

This court has adopted the

following standard of review with regard to a challenge for
sufficiency of the evidence:
10

In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence,
this Court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and will interfere
only when the evidence is so lacking and
insubstantial that a reasonable person would not
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Jamison, 99 Utah Adv.
Rpt. 32, 34 (1989), quoting State v. Tanner, 675
P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983)
The jury heard the testimony of Trooper Cady during this
trial and, obviously, concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant, Gary L. Bouck, had been proven guilty.

The Trooper's

testimony included evidence as to the identification he made when
he arrested the defendant and transported him to the Davis County
Jail.

It is ludicrous to claim that because Trooper Cady did not

physically point at the defendant in court and proclaim, "That is
him!", that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to
convict.
CONCLUSION
The only matter or issue to be considered is whether it was
necessary to have an "in-court" identification of this defendant as
part of the trial process.
There are, of course, cases in which identity is truly an
issue and it must be established in a reliable manner.

In this

case, identity was never truly an issue. The trooper established
the identity of the defendant and testified that he had done so at
trial.

The jury heard the testimony and concluded that the

defendant, Gary L. Bouck, was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The issue of identity has been raised by the defendant solely in
connection with the "in-court" identification of the person who sat
11

at the defense table during trial. There was no question raised as
to the identification made by Trooper Cady on July 16, 1989, of the
arrested individual as the named defendant, Gary L. Bouck.
The defendant argues that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person sitting at the counsel
table was the same person who was arrested for Driving Under the
Influence. The prosecution hereby observes that it is not required
to prove at all, much less beyond a reasonable doubt, who might be
seated at the counsel table.

Is there a requirement to point to

the person seated at the defendant's table with the defense counsel
and identify him as being the defendant? The answer is that there
is no such requirement, and the verdict reached by the jury in this
case should be upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thlsL_S^ day of

JULY

1990

^^AM>^

James E.

Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

12

ADDENDUM

A.

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953, as amended) et sea.

B.

Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953, as amended)

C.

Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1990)

13

A. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953, as amended) et seq.
41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of
license.
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any
person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours
after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the
vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a communityservite work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and,
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require
the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or
the work in the community-service work program, order the person to
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol
rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second conviction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in
addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not lesp^han 720 nor more than 2,160 hours with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or work in the
community-service work program, order the person to obtain treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.

(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation
or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated and the department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is
a second or subsequent conviction within five years, until the convicted
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all
fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, have been paid.
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing
court to order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility;
or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or
do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7). The
court is required to render the same order regarding education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as the court would render in
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent
conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section
41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a
prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or
other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by
the Department of Social Services.
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original
charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of
proof of the facts which shows whether there was consumption of ?lcohol
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with
the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no
contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person ior a violation of
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1),
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a
period of five years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall
subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for
which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of
conviction is based.

B. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953, as amended)
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
• • •

(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
• • •

(d)
appeals from the circuit courts,
except those from the small claims department of
a circuit court;

15

C

Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1990)

Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions:
(1)
In prosecutions of misdemeanors and
infractions, defendants may consent in writing to
trial in his absence;
(2)
In prosecutions for offenses not
punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary
absence from the trial after notice to defendant
of the time for trial shall not prevent the case
from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant
had been present; and
(3)
The court may exclude or excuse a
defendant from trial for good cause shown which
may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous
conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require
the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the ^>y day of UUL |
,
1990, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent were mailed with postage prepaid thereon, to the
following:
Larry Long
Attorney for Appellant
39 Exchange Place
Second Floor
Salt Lake City UT 84111-2705
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